Last week Sears Holdings made several interesting announcements. First, it declared it was closing 63 more stores, in a continued false notion that it can shrink itself to prosperity. This is in addition to the 358 Sears and Kmarts already shuttered in 2017. Then it issued a press release detailing steps it’s taking to improve its financial structure, wherein it included operating results for the quarter. Despite over a decade of strategic restructuring, huge investments in its membership program and digital capabilities, closing hundreds of its worst locations–not to mention massive store closings on the part of many of its direct competitors–the company expected to report comparable store sales declines of 15.3% for the quarter and a loss of at least $525 million. Yikes!
Following all this, in what is likely to win the award for the most obvious prediction by a Wall Street investment analyst in modern history, Bill Dreher of Susquehanna opined that “Sears may never be profitable again.”
So while Sears apparently has a few folks willing to believe something good might still happen, the company continues to execute what I have long called “the world’s slowest liquidation sale.” In fact, Sears continues to act as if we’re all either gullible or stupid. Or perhaps both.
Despite growing signs of its imminent demise–or at least a complete collapse into a holding company with a small and decidedly mixed bag of residual assets–Sears Holdings CEO Eddie Lampert continues to put lipstick on the pig. A couple of weeks ago he took the Wall Street Journal to task for a rather harsh story by posting a retort on the company’s blog, in which he once again neglects to discuss anything that would meaningfully improve customer relevance, but goes to great lengths to highlight moves that are clearing perpetuating, if not accelerating, declining performance. And in what may be the surest sign that the company’s beleaguered CEO has no capacity for irony, the day after the company shared its horrible quarterly performance Sears announced it was opening two (count ‘em two!) small format appliance mattress stores.
The news at Sears went from bad to sad a long time ago. As I have recounted before, back in 2003 when I was part of the senior team working on trying to fix the department store business, it was abundantly clear that Sears’ concentration of assets (particularly for its home business) in regional malls was a significant and growing liability. It was also apparent that Sears had much more of a revenue problem that a cost problem. As we sit here fourteen years later, average store sales productivity has declined in virtually every quarter since I moved on from the outhouse to the penthouse (Neiman Marcus Group) and beyond. The major appliance and home improvement businesses, which once were incredibly profitable, are largely decimated. Years of cost cutting have made Sears’ stores an embarrassment. Market share continues to plummet.
In the spirit of full disclosure, our team did not come up with a compelling plan to turn around Sears, so for me it has always been an open question whether anybody could have saved them. I was certainly neither smart enough, nor powerful enough, to make it happen. But I have always hoped Lampert and team would figure it out.
In any event, at this point any notion that Sears can be saved in any way remotely resembling a major national retail brand is the pinnacle of wishful thinking. Yet some people still seem to hold out hope. It’s time to let that go.
Dead brand walking.